
“Former President Moon Jae-in’s claim that North Korea amasses nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes did not make any sense to me,” former U.S. National Security Adviser Herbert Raymond McMaster, 62, said in a video interview with the Chosunilbo on Sept. 4. “Just look at the record of aggression on the Korean Peninsula since June of 1950 - every act of aggression has been from the North.”
He noted that President Moon bought into the idea that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s nuclear ambitions were for deterrent purposes and ended up conveying “overly optimistic” and misguided information to the U.S.
McMaster, a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General who served as the second National Security Adviser in the Trump administration from February 2017 to March 2018, recently published ‘At War with Ourselves: My Tour of Duty in the Trump White House,’ a revealing account of his thirteen months in the Trump administration.
In the book, he wrote that during the first U.S.-South Korea summit in June 2017, five months after Trump took office, President Moon stated that Kim Jong Un viewed his nuclear arsenal as “necessary for defense,” leading to a disagreement between McMaster and then-Vice President Mike Pence. He also stated that South Korean and U.S. security officials have repeatedly clashed over how to respond to North Korea’s provocations and the direction of denuclearization.
“The Moon administration was telling North Korea what North Korea wanted to hear and was telling President Trump and our administration what we wanted to hear, he said. “They were playing the role of matchmaker.” He argued that in the end, the message Moon delivered to the U.S. - suggesting that Kim Jong Un was willing to give up his nuclear weapons - was unrealistic and overly optimistic.
During his tenure as national security adviser, McMaster was the key architect behind the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” policy, which aimed to increase sanctions and apply more pressure on North Korea to achieve denuclearization. However, he was dismissed in March 2018 after confronting Trump about managing relations with U.S. adversaries like Russia. He was succeeded by hardliner John Bolton.
His expression turned tense when asked about the potential implications for the Korean Peninsula if Trump were to be re-elected in the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November. McMaster said Trump would likely seek another summit with Kim Jong Un. “I hope what he will try to achieve [in any further negotiations] is complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea.”
McMaster is widely regarded as an exceptional war strategist. During the early days of the Trump-Kim Jong Un exchanges, he played a stabilizing role within the White House National Security Council (NSC). “Scaling back U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises for negotiations with North Korea was a major mistake by Trump,” he said. “I don’t think Trump always made reckless decisions. His disruptive personality actually helped implement a pressure strategy that kept North Korea uncertain about his next move.” According to McMaster’s memoir, while Trump initially pushed his team to apply strong pressure on North Korea, he later shifted to seeking dialogue with Kim Jong Un.
What caused Trump to change direction in his North Korea policy?
“I think what changed Donald Trump’s perspective was Donald Trump himself. In ‘At War with Ourselves,’ I discuss how President Trump is predisposed toward disrupting policies. Initially, I think that was a good thing, because it was clear that the Obama administration’s policy of strategic patience wasn’t working with North Korea. So, Trump’s disruptive nature helped in implementing the maximum pressure strategy.
However, he often had a great deal of confidence in his ability to make a deal. I don’t think he fully understood the extent to which multiple summits with Kim Jong Un—and some of the things he said about him, you know, like falling in love with him—would alleviate the pressure on the North and give those who were already predisposed to not enforcing sanctions an excuse not to do so.”
If Trump is re-elected, do you think he would try to meet with Kim Jong Un again?
“I think he will try to have another summit. And I hope what he aims for is the complete and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea, because that’s what the world needs.
I outlined for the President three key principles: Don’t rush to the negotiating table, don’t view diplomacy and military options separately, and don’t lift sanctions prematurely. I think he followed my suggestions for a while.
I hope that if President Trump gets re-elected, he will return to recognizing those principles. I believe they still hold true today.”
Do you think Kim Jong-un is waiting for Trump to regain power?
“I believe so. What Kim Jong-un hopes for from Trump is a ‘weak agreement.’ While he might give up some long-range missiles, he is likely to hold onto his existing nuclear weapons and short-range missiles aimed at South Korea. After that, he could try to take advantage of Trump’s skepticism about stationing U.S. troops overseas and make an effort to withdraw U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula. However, I believe all of Kim Jong-un’s efforts will ultimately fail, as Trump is unlikely to be deceived by him again, as he was during his first term. Despite this, Kim Jong-un will continue to pursue these goals. His recent anti-unification declaration and the increased level of missile provocations may very well be laying the groundwork for another summit with Trump.”
Your memoir mentions that former President Moon Jae-in told Vice President Pence that Kim Jong-un believes he needs nuclear weapons for defense. What are your thoughts on President Moon’s statement?
“Since the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, every act of military aggression on the Korean Peninsula has been initiated by North Korea. North Korea possesses not only nuclear weapons but also conventional weapons systems that place Seoul within striking range. The claim that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal is purely for defense, as stated by President Moon, does not make sense. At the time, we even joked among ourselves that the Moon administration seemed like a revival of the Sunshine Policy from the Kim Dae-jung government. President Moon’s belief was in stark contrast to the views of Trump and then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which was frustrating. When there are divisions between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan, the only beneficiaries are North Korea and China.”
Why did former President Moon make that assessment?
“The Moon administration was acting as a matchmaker between the U.S. and North Korea. Moon would tell Kim Jong-un that Donald Trump was eager for a summit, and then he would tell President Trump that Kim Jong-un really wants to solve denuclearization issues through a summit. He was essentially telling both sides what they wanted to hear. Moon’s motivation was good. He was trying to get some kind of diplomatic breakthrough. But he was overly optimistic about North Korea’s intentions. It gives North Korea hope that there could be another far-left government that has long maintained a strange affinity for the North and a strain of anti-Americanism. This is a very small minority on the left in South Korea—a minority that gives Kim Jong-un hope.”
During his term, Trump held three summits with Kim Jong-un. After their first summit in Singapore in June 2018, Trump made some relatively favorable decisions for Kim Jong-un, such as unilaterally canceling joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises. However, Trump’s distrust of Kim Jong-un grew over time, and ultimately, the U.S.-North Korea summits did not lead to any substantial outcomes.
What signal did the cancellation of the U.S.-South Korea joint exercises send to Kim Jong-un?
“I think that was a big mistake to suspend the exercises after the Singapore Summit. If I had been still in the White House at that time, I would tell Trump not to curtail the exercises. Kim Jong-un will say these exercises are provocative, but they are not. They are important for ensuring we are prepared to defend against a country that has sunk ships, shot down aircraft, conducted guerrilla attacks, and attacked the Blue House.”
Many are concerned that if Trump is reelected, there will be no more officials who, like you, would try to curb his hasty and sometimes reckless decisions.
“I don’t think President Trump made reckless decisions. He made informed decisions based on reports from his advisors. If a second Trump administration comes into power, I expect that strong figures will be appointed to support him, and there will be strong voices in foreign policy. If Mike Pompeo were to return, he would provide a solid center. Bill Hagerty, who served as Ambassador to Japan, is well-acquainted with the North Korean threat. Senators Tom Cotton and Dan Sullivan have also been vocal about the North Korean threat. Within the Republican Party, there are individuals who, while trusted by Trump, do not have illusions about Kim Jong-un and the intentions of the Kim regime.”
In his book, McMaster voiced concerns that the North Korean nuclear threat could lead South Korea and Japan to lose faith in the U.S. ‘nuclear umbrella’ and consider developing their own nuclear weapons. He also noted the rising public support in South Korea for independent nuclear armament, adding, “It’s undeniable that the North Korean nuclear issue has become more serious.”
What are your thoughts on South Korea moving toward nuclear armament?
“I believe there are ways to reassure South Korea without it going nuclear. First, it’s crucial to make it clear to North Korea that any use of nuclear weapons against South Korea would be suicidal. Strengthening trilateral military exercises between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan is also essential. We could explore options like sharing U.S. nuclear weapons with South Korea and Japan, similar to the arrangements some NATO countries have, or even redeploying long-range nuclear missiles on the Korean Peninsula. The priority should be reinforcing deterrence against North Korea.”
How would a second Trump presidency affect South Korea?
“Trump’s favorite words are ‘reciprocity’ and ‘burden sharing’—his top two priorities. While he can sometimes be inconsistent, he remains firm on these points. South Korea needs to emphasize the importance of its investment in the U.S., the deep connection between their economies, and the geopolitical significance of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Above all, it’s essential to highlight that the relationship benefits both sides. I believe Trump understands all this.”
☞ Who is Herbert R. McMaster
McMaster (born July 24, 1962), a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general, served as the 25th National Security Advisor from 2017 to 2018 during the early part of Donald Trump’s first term. Time Magazine once recognized him as the Army’s leading “warrior-thinker” of the 21st century. He graduated from West Point in 1984 and later earned a Ph.D. in American history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His dissertation, which took a critical look at the failures of American strategy and leadership during the Vietnam War, became the foundation for his book “Dereliction of Duty,” a staple within the U.S. military. A seasoned veteran of the Gulf War, Iraq War, and Afghanistan War, McMaster was dismissed from his position after disagreements with President Trump over policy on North Korea and Russia.