Speculation is growing in global financial circles over the prospect of a so-called “Mar-a-Lago Accord,” a new multilateral agreement aimed at managing the value of the U.S. dollar under President Donald Trump’s second term.
According to foreign media reports as of April 14, Trump’s economic advisers are considering a framework for international currency coordination as part of efforts to address the United States’ twin deficits — in the federal budget and current account. The concept draws comparisons to the 1985 Plaza Accord, which saw major economies jointly intervene in currency markets to weaken the dollar.
The term “Mar-a-Lago Accord” was first introduced by Stephen Miran, chair of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, in a report published in November 2024 titled A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System. In it, Miran argued that chronic U.S. trade deficits, exacerbated by a strong dollar, required America’s allies to share the burden of adjustment.
His proposal called for allied nations to sell off shorter-term U.S. Treasuries and purchase newly issued 100-year ultra-long bonds, ideally with near-zero interest rates. The aim is to ease the U.S. government’s debt-servicing costs, reduce fiscal deficits, and curb upward pressure on interest rates, ultimately tempering dollar strength.
Miran also recommended that if allies refused to cooperate, the U.S. should leverage tariffs and security alliances in trade negotiations. He cited the high tariffs imposed during the U.S.-China trade war in 2018–2019, claiming they boosted federal revenues without triggering inflation. His report suggested setting optimal country-specific tariffs at around 20%.
Market analysts note similarities between the proposed Mar-a-Lago Accord and the Plaza Accord, in that both aim to engineer a weaker dollar through coordinated policy. The Plaza Accord, led by the United States alongside Japan, West Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, resulted in a sharp depreciation of the dollar, with the Japanese yen and Deutsche mark rising more than 50% within two years.
Initially, Miran’s proposals were seen as politically improbable due to the risk of destabilizing global capital flows. However, Trump’s aggressive use of tariffs and security alliances as bargaining tools has raised the possibility that a currency pact could emerge as a defining element of his global economic strategy.
If implemented, the plan would have mixed implications for South Korea’s economy. In the short term, a stronger won would lower import prices and ease inflation while stabilizing financial markets. Given Korea’s export-oriented manufacturing sector, a stronger currency could also reduce production costs for finished goods.
Over the longer term, however, many experts warn of potential downsides. If tariffs and dollar depreciation efforts proceed in parallel, South Korean companies could face pressure to relocate manufacturing facilities to the United States, potentially affecting domestic employment and export volumes.
Moreover, a shift in foreign exchange reserves toward U.S. ultra-long bonds could weaken South Korea’s liquidity buffers in the event of currency market turbulence, undermining financial market stability.
Analysts remain divided on whether the plan will move forward. Park Soo-yeon, a researcher at Meritz Securities, said, “Unlike the Plaza Accord, when key countries like Japan and Germany had the economic strength to negotiate, few economies today are in a stable enough position. The likelihood of a Mar-a-Lago Accord materializing is low.”
Kim Chan-hee of Shinhan Securities believes U.S. allies may weigh the costs of tariffs against the burden of participating in a currency agreement and opt for a pragmatic compromise. “A modified deal is possible,” he said.
Park Sang-hyun, an analyst at iM Securities, cautioned against ruling out the scenario entirely. “Given Trump’s unpredictability and his administration’s clear determination to tackle fiscal deficits in his second term, it would be premature to dismiss this scenario. Issuing 100-year zero-coupon bonds could serve as a bargaining chip to pressure allies into either accepting a stronger currency or increasing U.S. Treasury purchases,” he noted.
