South Korea’s presidential office indicated that the country might support Ukraine with lethal weapons, targeting Russia, which recently signed a military cooperation treaty with North Korea. The government also plans to expand its independent sanctions against Russia and North Korea while strengthening its security cooperation with the United States and Japan. The military alliance between North Korea and Russia is seen as a severe threat to South Korea’s security, prompting the use of all available leverage. However, there are criticisms that the government failed to predict this situation due to initial intelligence shortcomings and is now responding belatedly.
On June 20, South Korea’s Director of National Security Chang Ho-jin chaired a National Security Council meeting at the presidential office in Yongsan, Seoul. He expressed “grave concern and condemnation” over the strengthening military and economic cooperation between North Korea and Russia. He mentioned that South Korea would review its stance on supporting Ukraine with weapons, hinting at the possibility of providing lethal aid.
Previously, the South Korean government provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine but refrained from supplying lethal weapons, considering its relationship with Russia. Despite behind-the-scenes requests from the U.S., President Yoon Suk-yeol had firmly stated last month that South Korea would not support offensive lethal weapons. However, the situation has changed given Russia’s de facto military alliance with North Korea, which openly calls for “territorial occupation in the southern hemisphere.” A presidential office official indicated that nonlethal precision-strike weapons might also be considered, signaling a step-by-step approach to pressure Russia.
The South Korean government also plans to increase the number of items subject to export controls related to Russia from the current 1,159 to 1,402, adding items such as synthetic resin products to the list. Additionally, four North Korean-related Russian ships and five institutions were designated for independent sanctions, including vessels, institutions, and individuals from Russia, North Korea, and third countries.
As an international response to the North Korea-Russia alliance, Chang stated that the “extended deterrence of the U.S.-Korea alliance and the security cooperation system between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan will be further strengthened.” At the end of this month, the South Korea-U.S.-Japan joint exercise Freedom Edge will take place, involving the U.S. nuclear aircraft carrier CVN-71 in a large-scale exercise in the waters off the Korean Peninsula. At the NATO summit scheduled for July, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and Western countries are expected to expand their cooperation.
Some critics argue that the South Korean government did not respond swiftly to the North Korea-Russia rapprochement. Before the treaty details were revealed after the North Korea-Russia summit, government officials unofficially dismissed the possibility of automatic military intervention as an overstatement. There was also a perception that the June 19 announcement by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was merely symbolic and not a substantive security threat. However, on the morning of June 20, when the treaty including the provision for immediate military aid was disclosed, it became clear that the government’s assessment was flawed.
The government’s failure to anticipate this situation was reportedly influenced by recent favorable comments from Putin regarding South Korea-Russia relations. On June 5, Putin met with representatives of major global news agencies and praised South Korea for not directly supplying weapons to Ukraine, expressing readiness to restore South Korea-Russia relations. He also stated his hope that the relationship between South Korea and Russia would not deteriorate.
A former high-ranking South Korean government official remarked, “It’s as if our government has been blindsided by Russia.”
