Tensions between South Korea and Russia have intensified following a new treaty restoring the Cold War-era military alliance between North Korea and Russia. South Korea’s National Security Adviser Chang Ho-jin expressed concern on June 23, saying, “If Russia gives North Korea highly advanced and precise weapons, what good is there for us anymore?” This implies that if Russia supplies advanced weaponry to North Korea, South Korea might respond by providing weapons to Ukraine without restriction.
The North Korea-Russia defense pact, described as a “dangerous deal” by both South Korea and the United States, has led to calls for exploring various nuclear options, including arming South Korea with its own nuclear weapons.
Following the agreement, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that South Korea potentially providing weapons of mass destruction to Ukraine would be a “big mistake” and that Russia “does not exclude the supply of ultra-precise weapons to North Korea.” These exchanges have heightened the sense of crisis between South Korea and Russia.
Chang said, “We cannot manage the relationship alone, and Russia must make corresponding efforts. Russia’s recent trends have gradually moved closer to the red line.”
The renewed comprehensive strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia has also reignited debates about South Korea’s nuclear armament, both domestically and internationally. With North Korea’s recent advancements in nuclear and missile capabilities and Russia’s pledge of military cooperation, South Korea is being urged to explore all options for nuclear balance.
The Institute for National Security Strategy, affiliated with the National Intelligence Service, released a strategy report following the North Korea-Russia summit. The report highlighted that Russia has “blatantly ignored UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea” and warned of the risk of North Korea’s de facto recognition as a nuclear power intensifying over time. The report suggested that the South Korean government should conduct a comprehensive review and strategic public debate on various alternatives. These include strengthening extended deterrence with the U.S., tactical nuclear redeployment, NATO-style nuclear sharing, and developing its own nuclear arsenal or potential nuclear capabilities.
The call for ‘potential nuclear capability’ involves securing the right to enrich uranium and reprocess nuclear fuel, activities currently restricted by the U.S.-South Korea nuclear agreement. Unlike Japan, which can enrich uranium without a separate consultation process with the U.S., South Korea imports all its uranium fuel and requires a written agreement with the U.S. to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.
Cheong Seong-chang, director of the Center for Korean Peninsula Strategy at Sejong Institute, said, “South Korea should start preparing now to quickly develop its own nuclear arsenal, especially if Trump wins the U.S. presidential election.”
