Sue Mi Terry, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has been indicted by U.S. federal prosecutors on charges related to her interactions with South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), highlighting concerns about the oversight and conduct of intelligence activities between the two countries.
Regarding the indictment of Terry, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), by U.S. federal prosecutors on charges of interacting with South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) agents, the NIS stated on Jul. 17 that “the intelligence authorities of South Korea and the United States are in close communication.”
It is unclear how much the NIS knew about Terry’s indictment before it was made public by the media. Since the indictment was made by federal prosecutors under the Department of Justice rather than the CIA, which is the direct counterpart to the NIS, it might have been challenging for the NIS to explain their position or request reconsideration from the U.S. in advance.‘
According to the indictment, the FBI tracked interactions between Terry and NIS agents over a decade, from 2013 to June of last year.
The “luxury shopping” involving Sue Mi Terry and NIS agents primarily took place during the Moon Jae-in administration from 2019 to 2021.
An intelligence community source indicated that during this period, many experienced field agents were either assigned to less important roles or left the service. As a result, analysts with less field experience were sent abroad, impacting intelligence operations. This situation persists, with skilled field agents still in less significant positions due to their previous administration ties.
Earlier this year, the NIS faced difficulties in the U.S. during an operation, suggesting that their field intelligence capabilities might still be lacking.
Criticism has arisen over the fact that NIS agents accompanied Terry on her luxury shopping trips, paid for purchases using diplomatic exemptions for tax-free benefits, and traveled in vehicles with diplomatic license plates, indicating a breach of basic protocols for intelligence officers.
A former senior official commented, “It’s common knowledge that whether diplomats or intelligence agents are dispatched abroad, they are under 24-hour surveillance by local intelligence and law enforcement agencies, but the actions of Sue Mi Terry and the NIS agents were too lax.”
The federal prosecution’s decision to charge Terry with violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) rather than the Espionage Act appears to be because she did not directly provide confidential U.S. documents to the NIS. The indictment details activities such as having meals with Terry and requesting her to arrange meetings with hard-to-reach U.S. contacts, which are routine activities for NIS officers dispatched abroad in a diplomatic capacity.
The $37,000 allegedly provided to Terry by the NIS was not handed over in cash but donated to the think tank where Terry worked under the name of the Korean Embassy in the U.S. Considering that Terry, who was the director of Korean affairs at the think tank at the time, also received funds from other government departments to run Korean programs and organize Korea-related academic events, this could be viewed as part of “diplomatic activities.”
