South Korea’s Muan air crash last December, involving a Jeju Air passenger plane, occurred after air traffic control instructed the pilot to switch runways moments before landing—despite the pilot’s repeated intention to land on a safer alternative, official communication records show.
Experts are now questioning whether the decision to change landing directions was appropriate, calling for the full release of communications between the control tower and the aircraft to prevent speculation. South Korea’s Aviation and Railway Accident Investigation Board, under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, has so far released only select portions of the recordings.
Final investigation reports can take over a year to complete. Under current law, the board has broad discretion over what information is disclosed.
According to a 4-minute-and-7-second segment of tower-pilot audio transcripts—not recorded by the aircraft’s black box and obtained exclusively by the Chosun Ilbo—the control tower directed the aircraft to approach runway 19, where a concrete embankment lay at the end, just over a minute before the crash. The pilot had initially requested to land on runway 01, a safer option with no embankment, three times prior to that.
After a bird strike during descent, the aircraft attempted a go-around, and the control tower instructed the crew to climb to 5,000 feet. At 8:59:34 a.m., about 30 seconds later, the pilot responded, saying he would turn left and land immediately—referring to runway 01.
But just 15 seconds later, the pilot reversed course, telling the tower the landing was “unable.” At 9:00:21, he requested permission to turn right and land on runway 01 instead. The tower asked for confirmation, and the pilot affirmed the plan.
The sudden change in landing direction came at 9:01:07. The tower asked, “Would you like to land on runway 19?” The pilot responded two seconds later, “Standing by for runway 19.” The tower then granted clearance at 9:01:11, noting calm winds. The plane landed roughly two minutes later and collided with the concrete slope.
Kim In-kyu, head of flight education at Korea Aerospace University, said the last-minute switch may have stemmed from the aircraft’s failure to properly execute a go-around. “The plane was tilting up to 37 degrees during the turn—more than 10 degrees beyond the normal angle,” he said.
However, aviation experts say the rationale behind the last-minute change remains unclear and requires further investigation.
Experts are also questioning the go-around decision itself. According to Boeing’s flight manual, after a bird strike, pilots are generally advised to continue the landing with reduced engine thrust, as applying more power could increase damage to already compromised engines.
The Jeju Air aircraft, which had descended to 875 feet in preparation for landing, began to climb after the bird strike but reached only 1,075 feet—well below the 5,000 feet requested by the tower.
Jung Yoon-sik, a professor of aviation at Catholic Kwandong University, said the crew may have misjudged the severity of the engine failure. “If they still attempted a climb after detecting engine trouble, it may suggest they didn’t fully grasp the situation. Trying to increase thrust may have worsened the damage,” he said.
