The Institute for National Security Strategy (INSS) of South Korea suggested that S. Korea should consider its own nuclear armament and acquire potential nuclear capabilities in light of the recent North Korea-Russia summit held last week. The INSS is referring to obtaining the rights to uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing, which are restricted under the U.S.-S. Korean Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation.
The INSS is regarded as one of the national policy research institutes in S. Korea. Although other national policy research institutes have previously mentioned the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or adopting a similar defense system like NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements in response to North Korea’s nuclear threat, it is rare for them to mention independent nuclear armament and the acquisition of reprocessing rights. The recent suggestion of INSS indicates that the recent North Korea-Russia summit poses a severe threat to S. Korea’s security.
At the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his intention to undermine the UN sanctions against North Korea due to its nuclear weapons program during his visit to Pyongyang.
The INSS stated that Putin’s move was “an indirect way of accepting North Korea’s nuclear armament.” The treaty signed by North Korea and Russia at the summit specifies cooperation on nuclear energy, implying that cooperating with a country that has withdrawn from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) acknowledges that country as a nuclear-armed state.
The U.S.’s nuclear agreement with India in 2008, a country not a member of the NPT, is another similar example. Additionally, China is already known to be accepting North Korea’s nuclear status.
Currently, S. Korea is bordered by North Korea, China, and Russia, and all three countries possess nuclear weapons and are governed by authoritarian regimes ruled by dictators. However, S. Korea faces them without its own nuclear arms. This disparity cannot be sustained and will inevitably lead to problems. While our society may be complacent, this is a serious security crisis.
However, relying solely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella has its limitations. This perspective is increasingly being expressed in the U.S. Congress and academia, where opinions on allowing the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons or sharing nuclear weapons in a NATO-like arrangement with South Korea are becoming more common.
Allison Hooker, a former senior director for Asia at the National Security Council, mentioned the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear arms, stating that “the strengthening relationship between North Korea and Russia is certainly pushing S. Korea in that direction.” Although this view is still in the minority, the number of people concerned about South Korea’s security is growing.
The S. Korean government should no longer taboo the discussion of the nuclear armament of the nation since we have passed the point where such discussions can be avoided.
S. Korea needs to persuade the U.S. that possessing nuclear weapons under mutual agreement would benefit the U.S.’s strategy in the Western Pacific. If Trump returns to power, S. Korea could consider demanding a nuclear option in exchange for agreeing to a significant increase in defense cost-sharing. Even if the U.S. finds it difficult to accept immediately, S. Korea must continue to pursue this option. If we don’t start now, the consequences will burden future generations.
