Two years ago, during an investigation into three espionage rings, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) reportedly identified over 100 individuals suspected of having ties to North Korea but could not proceed with investigations. This was due to the National Intelligence Service Korea Act, which took effect in January 2024, transferring the NIS’s counterespionage authority, including its ability to investigate violations of the National Security Act, to the police. In November 2022, the NIS chose to prosecute only 11 suspects for whom clear evidence existed, while over 100 others in the preliminary stages of investigation were left untouched. A former senior NIS official who oversaw the investigation remarked, “With just two to three more years, we could have uncovered the full extent of the espionage rings.” However, the transfer of counterespionage authority prevented the NIS from fully dismantling these networks.
Even more concerning is the fact that the NIS did not pass the list of these 100 suspects to the police. While the police had created a new unit to handle counterespionage cases, the NIS believed the police lacked the experience and investigative capability to manage such complex cases, as well as the ability to maintain confidentiality. As a result, the NIS withheld the names. These 100 individuals had frequent contact with North Korean agents and were identified as recruitment targets by the North. Consequently, these espionage suspects are now operating without any monitoring or oversight.
The responsibility for this alarming situation lies with the administration of former President Moon Jae-in and the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK). In December 2020, the Moon administration pushed through a revision of the National Intelligence Service Korea Act, transferring the NIS’s counterespionage powers to the police. While intelligence agencies worldwide are strengthening their authority, South Korea has moved in the opposite direction, weakening the NIS’s core functions. In fact, 11 DPK lawmakers have proposed a bill that would strip the NIS of its authority to investigate national security crimes entirely. This move would effectively disarm the NIS’s ability to counter threats from anti-state forces. The question must be asked: can a country facing such threats afford this kind of negligence?
The expertise required to investigate espionage and maintain overseas counterintelligence networks is not developed overnight. Meetings between the suspects in the three espionage rings and North Korean agents took place mainly abroad, and the NIS investigation had been ongoing for seven to eight years. The success of this investigation was due to the expertise NIS agents built over years of work in the same position. By contrast, the police, despite their dedication, face limitations due to frequent personnel rotations, which hinder long-term investigations.
The National Intelligence Service Korea Act must be revised urgently to restore the NIS’s investigative powers. If opposition from the DPK makes full restoration difficult, an alternative solution should be considered, such as creating a separate security agency that combines the counterespionage expertise of both the NIS and the police.
