Joseph Yun, the acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, clarified on March 18 that the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) designation of South Korea as a “sensitive country” is strictly about security at its research labs. “This situation got out of control, but it’s not a big deal,” he said. While it is true that South Korea was added to the list, it is simply a security measure for DOE-affiliated labs and does not fundamentally impact U.S.-South Korea relations.
The DOE operates 17 research labs focusing on nuclear weapons, advanced materials, and supercomputing. Last year, over 2,000 South Korean researchers and students visited these labs, leading to some cases of sensitive information leaks. This prompted the inclusion of South Korea on the “sensitive country list,” which requires longer review periods for research visits and collaborations. The U.S. was particularly concerned about an incident a year ago when a contract worker at one of these labs was caught attempting to board a flight to South Korea with restricted nuclear reactor design software. The most effective way to resolve this issue is through discreet diplomatic discussions.
Before the facts were even fully understood, South Korean politicians escalated the situation into a political debate. The ruling People Power Party (PPP) blamed the issue on the Democratic Party’s (DP) “pro-China, anti-U.S. stance,” though they provided no evidence to support this claim. Meanwhile, the DP pointed to discussions about South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons as the cause. DP lawmaker Youn Kun-young, a former envoy to North Korea, argued that the situation was the result of “irresponsible nuclear armament rhetoric” from PPP lawmakers and President Yoon Suk-yeol. DP leader Lee Jae-myung also condemned what he called “empty nuclear threats.” Despite both parties making unsubstantiated claims, neither has issued an apology or corrected their statements.
The DP’s near-obsessive opposition to nuclear armament is reaching almost pathological levels. Few political groups in the world react as strongly against nuclear deterrence when faced with threats from a hostile, nuclear-armed adversary. While Kim Jong-un continues expanding North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, the DP offers little beyond its idealistic commitment to the Sunshine Policy.
In recent years, some experts in the U.S. have raised concerns about South Korea’s need for an independent nuclear deterrent. Ukraine’s current situation—having given up its nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees that ultimately proved ineffective—has only reinforced this argument. However, despite its frequent anti-U.S. rhetoric, the DP insists that South Korea should not even discuss the issue because “the U.S. wouldn’t like it.” That logic is hard to understand.
